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The ability to infer unseen causes from evidence is argued to emerge early in
development and to be uniquely human. We explored whether preschoolers
and capuchin monkeys could locate a reward based on the physical traces
left following a hidden event. Preschoolers and capuchin monkeys were pre-
sented with two cups covered with foil. Behind a barrier, an experimenter (E)
punctured the foil coverings one at a time, revealing the cups with one cover
broken after the first event and both covers broken after the second. One event
involved hiding a reward, the other event was performed with a stick (order
counterbalanced). Preschoolers and, with additional experience, monkeys
could connect the traces to the objects used in the puncturing events to find
the reward. Reversing the order of events perturbed the performance of
3-year olds and capuchins, while 4-year-old children performed above
chance when the order of events was reversed from the first trial. Capuchins
performed significantly better on the ripped foil task than they did on an
arbitrary test in which the covers were not ripped but rather replaced with
a differently patterned cover. We conclude that by 4 years of age children
spontaneously reason backwards from evidence to deduce its cause.1. Introduction
A scientist presented with a skin rash, a child discovering her toy box open and an
animal coming across footprints all face a similar challenge. There is a gap in their
knowledge about what caused these visual traces and detecting the culprit is desir-
able.While there is nodoubt that adults look for anddetect causes given incomplete
information, there is less consensus onwhen the ability to think about causality in a
theory-like way emerges in human development [1–3]. Whether or not this skill
exists at all in non-human animals is also a matter of debate [4,5]. These issues
mainly originate from the fact that making inferences about an unseen cause is
not the only way of responding appropriately to indirect evidence.
If one repeatedly encounters certain events in close spatio-temporal proxi-
mity (e.g. a jaguar walking past and leaving footprints behind), one may
learn to use the latter as a cue to the former without causal reasoning [6].
Such statistical learning is common to humans, even in infancy [7] as well as
several species of non-human animals [8]. In addition, humans, once they
have language, can use testimony from others [9,10]. Given these alternative
routes to responding to unseen causes, it has been a challenge to distinguish
them in developmental and comparative research.
In this paper, we aim to explore the developmental and phylogenetic origins
of the ability to use evidence to detect a hidden cause. From an evolutionary
perspective, some authors suggested that humans are the only species capable
of representing and reasoning about causality [4], while others contend that we
may share some mechanisms for dealing with natural causal structures, in order
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to infer the location of food or when using tools [5]. Never-
theless, there is general agreement that some components of
human causal reasoning represent a significant departure
from anything present in other animals. The tendency to
seek explanations for unseen events is one candidate, because
it might require a kind of thinking about past possibilities
scaffolded through cultural and linguistic input over human
development [11,12]. From a developmental perspective,
the timing of emergence of this ability is therefore important,
as it helps us to determine whether humans have a natural
tendency to look for and infer causal relations in their
environments early in life, perhaps even from birth [13,14].
If so, its development may follow a single trajectory into
adulthood and the difference between younger and older
children and adults may be explained by other domain-
general components (e.g. information processing capacity)
and expanding causal knowledge. Alternatively, early reason-
ing abilities may undergo a significant developmental change
in childhood due to the cultural input from others with the
development of language [1,10].
In the last few decades, developmental research has
found extensive evidence for various kinds of causal infer-
ence in preschool children. They used information about
physical mechanism not just spatio-temporal contiguity
[13,15,16], inferred whether objects had causal power based
on conditional probabilities and interventions [17,18],
expected to find a hidden cause when they were presented
with an unexpected outcome [19,20] and came up with infor-
mative tests that could uncover ambiguity [21]. These studies
often demonstrated a developmental difference between 3
and 4 years of age [13,15,18,22].
However, the existence of a causal relationship and even
the possibility that it might be unseen was provided in the
verbal framing of these tasks (e.g. ‘Which blower made the
candle go?’, ‘Why are the puppets moving together? Is it X,
Y or something else?’). These prompts did not specify the
exact cause, but they testified that the covariations children
observed were causal [10]. Such prompts have been shown
to boost preschoolers’ performance in a number of studies
[23–27]. To find out more about how children diagnose
causes from evidence alone, it is desirable to provide less
explicit verbal instructions. This would also facilitate com-
parisons between children and non-human primates, to
examine the evolution of this ability.
From a comparative perspective, some researchers have
argued that non-human primates cannot extract causal
relations from spatio-temporal regularities [4,28]. Limitations
in performance in some tasks provide support for this
interpretation [25,29–33]. By contrast, others assert that non-
human primates can extract causal knowledge beyond per-
ceptual information if the testing situation does not
overload other cognitive resources [5]. This has been shown
in research that compared animals’ learning in two contexts:
(i) where the evidence was caused by the food, and (ii) where
the evidence correlated with the food’s presence but the
relation was arbitrary [34–37]. For example, when food was
hidden on a balance beam, apes preferred the end of the
beam that moved down with food’s weight but they did not
have a preference for the lower beam when an experimenter
pushed it down [35].
In this study, we asked: do preschoolers and non-human
primates spontaneously use visual traces to locate a reward?
If so, is this ability driven by inferring causal relations orassociative learning of task-specific features? We tested capu-
chin monkeys; extractive foragers with a high proclivity to
manipulate objects. Capuchins mostly feed on seasonal
fruits; during the dry season they locate unseen food inside
tree barks, husks and shells, and underground nests [38]. In
such unstable environments, the ability to make inferences
about hidden causes based on incomplete observational evi-
dence (e.g. inferring that a nut is empty based on wormholes
on its shell) would allow the monkey to go beyond learning
only about causal relations that they can manipulate (e.g. tap-
ping on the nut to infer its fullness or weighing a tool before
using it to crack a nut) [39]. There is evidence that capuchin
monkeys use the sound of a baited shaken cup to locate a
reward, though they failed to reason by exclusion when an
empty cup was shaken instead [36,40]. They have been
reported to explore the weight of a nut or a stone tool
before opening or using it; however, the role of extensive
prior experience was not eliminated as an associative expla-
nation in these cases [41,42]. To our knowledge, this is the
first study that assessed reasoning about unseen causes
based on indirect visual evidence in capuchin monkeys.
The current task required participants to locate a reward in
one of two cups covered with foil, based on the appearance of
rips in the foil covers following two sequential, partially hidden
events. Previous research shows that children at least by 3 years
of age can update their knowledge (i.e. about the location of the
reward) as they receive direct visual information about events
in a certain order [43,44]. In our task, they will be required to
do so using indirect visual information. As for the capuchin
monkeys, there is also evidence for the capacity to represent
hidden objects: they expected to find the same number/type
of rewards in an apparatus as they had previously seen being
hidden [45]. In the current study, E covered two empty cups
at the beginning of each trial with foil and showed participants
that the covers were intact. Behind a barrier, she punctured the
foil coverings one at a time, revealing the cups with one cover
broken after the first event and both covers broken after the
second (figure 1). In one event she first showed that she had
a reward in her hand, then punctured one cup with the
reward behind the barrier and dropped it in that cup, revealing
an empty hand. In the other event, she punctured the foil cov-
ering the other cup with a pen/stick. The order of these events
was counterbalanced across participants. Participants could
locate the reward in the correct cup if they inferred the cause
of the ripped foil but also if they learnt an arbitrary rule such
as choosing the first/last change they saw. The latter route to
success was tested in the Transfer phase, in which the order
of events was reversed. We hypothesized that if the partici-
pants made inferences, they should search for the reward in
the correct cup without a drop in performance in the Transfer
phase. However, if the participants used an arbitrary rule to
solve the task in the Test phase, we expected them to perform
at or below chance level in the Transfer phase.2. Experiment 1—children
(a) Methods
(i) Participants
Eighty-three 3–5-year olds (Mage = 52.10, s.d.age = 9.58) par-
ticipated. Six additional children were tested but did not
complete the task. Age and sex were counterbalanced as
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 1. A visual illustration of the (a) Pre-test, (b) Test and (c) Transfer phases of Experiment 1. The illustration shows a sticker–pen trial for the Test phase and a
pen–sticker trial for the Transfer phase (note that the order of conditions was counterbalanced across participants). The star represents the reward, and the stick
represents the pen. The barrier and the cups are depicted as semi-transparent for the reader but these were opaque in the study. The diagonal arrow shows the
temporal progression of the trial. (Online version in colour.)
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much as possible (electronic supplementary material, table
S1). Our target sample size was 32 children in each age
group (stated in the ethics application). Due to the opportu-
nistic sampling approach in nurseries, time constraints, high
drop-out rates in the pre-test phase in 3-year olds (N = 11)
and the lower number of 5-year olds in nurseries we only
reached our target sample size with 4-year olds. No analysis
was conducted prior to the end of data collection. The study
was ethically approved by University of St Andrews Teaching
and Research Ethics Committee and informed consent was
taken from parents/guardians.
(b) Materials
Two different coloured plastic cups (pink and blue), were
placed on a table apart (approx. 20 cm) from each other.
The cups were covered with pieces of aluminium foil. Stickers
were used as rewards and a brightly coloured pen was used
as the non-reward object to poke holes in the foil covers.
A barrier was used to conceal the ripping events.
(i) Procedure
Pre-test. E covered the cups with foil and placed the barrier in
front of them. She picked up a sticker from the table while the
child watched and put it in one of the cups. The action of for-
cing the sticker through the foil was completely hidden from
the child’s perspective, though they could hear the foil being
punctured (figure 1). When the barrier was removed, E
moved the cups apart, tilted them slightly and asked,
‘Where do you think the sticker is?’ If the child pointed to
the correct cup, E removed the foil and gave the sticker to
the child. She then removed the foil covering the other cupto reveal that it was empty. If the child did not find the
sticker, E showed the contents of both cups and prepared
for the next trial. The criterion was the first two consecutive
trials correct or four trials correct in a maximum of five
trials. Otherwise, the participant was considered a drop-out
(15 children: eleven 3-year olds and four 4-year olds).
Of the 68 participants who passed the pre-test, 64 of them
passed it within two trials and four needed five trials
(M = 2.18, s.d. = 0.71).
Test. After the pre-test, E said ‘This game was too easy for
you! Shall we make it more fun?’ and introduced the new task.
‘Now the game is slightly different. I will cover the cups again
and I will put these here (as she put a pen and a sticker on the
table where the child could see). Now watch me till the end
and then point to the cup you think the sticker is in! Ready?’
The participants saw E rip the two cups in one of the two
orders:
(1) Sticker–pen: E first picked up the sticker and used it to
puncture the foil covering one of the cups behind the
barrier and she dropped the sticker in the cup. The pen
remained in view. Then she removed the barrier to reveal
the foil covering one of the cups was ripped. Next, she
put the barrier back saying, ‘Keep watching’ and took
the pen to rip the other cup. Then, she placed the pen
back on the table, removed the barrier revealing both
cups were ripped and asked ‘Now, where is the sticker?’
(2) Pen–sticker: The set-up was the same but this time E first
picked up the pen and then the sticker.
After the participants received eight trials of Test, they
moved on to the Transfer phase.
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0
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Figure 2. Performance of children in the Test (a) and Transfer (b) phases. Dotted line shows the chance level. Dashed line shows the model predictions, and the
shaded area is the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval (with the predictor variables age, phase, trial type, trial number and sex centred). Children’s responses to
the explanation question at the end of the task is presented as open (incorrect) and solid (correct) circles. (Online version in colour.)
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Transfer. In this phase, the participants received eight
trials in the reverse order (e.g. if they had sticker–pen trials
in Test, they received pen–sticker trials in Transfer).
Every trial in the Test and Transfer phases started with
two cups covered with foil, had an intermediate stage in
which the barrier was removed to show the cover on one
cup was ripped and ended with both covers being ripped.
The two poking events were always done on different cups
and the participants could hear two puncturing sounds.
The side of the blue/pink cup was randomized across partici-
pants, but stayed the same for each participant (e.g. blue
always on the left). The cup on which the sticker was
hidden varied in a pseudo-random fashion in each phase
with the constraint that it appeared equally in both cups,
and never in the same cup more than twice in succession.
The pen and the sticker lay at the same side of the table
throughout the game for each subject.
Explanation question. At the end of the task, E asked; ‘How
did you decide which cup to choose?’ If children did not
reply, E elaborated ‘Sometimes the sticker was in the blue
cup and sometimes in the pink cup. How did you know
where it was?’(ii) Scoring and analysis
The first choice of the participants was scored as their
response.
We analysed the data using generalized linear mixed
models (GLMM) [46]; with binomial error structure and
logit link function using the function glmer of the R-package
lme4 [47]. For the first trial analysis in the Transfer phase, we
conducted a binomial test. More details concerning the analy-
sis can be found in the electronic supplementary material.
Children’s responses to the explanation question were
categorized as ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’. The incorrect expla-
nations consisted of those that referred to the wrong/
improbable ways of solving the task (e.g. the sticker was
put in cups in alternating fashion, ‘I heard them’, ‘I saw
through the barrier’) and those that did not refer to anystrategy (e.g. ‘I don’t know’, ‘I just guessed’, points to the
cups). The correct explanations consisted of those that
referred to the ripping of the cups (e.g. ‘You smashed it
when you put it in’, ‘It got popped’).
The data for all the experiments reported in this paper can
be found in the electronic supplementary material.(c) Results
Children performed significantly above chance in both the Test
(intercept-only GLMM Estimate ± s.e.: 1.63 ± 0.22, z = 7.43,
p < 0.001) and Transfer (1.36 ± 0.20, z = 7.07, p < 0.001) phases.
The full model comprising two interaction terms age*phase
and trial-type*phase, with sex and trial number as fixed effects
fitted the data better than the null model (likelihood-ratio test:
x26 ¼ 34:16, p < 0.001; electronic supplementary material,
table S2). The trial-type*phase interaction was not significant;
however, figure 2 shows a trend for a steeper age effect in
Transfer phase (age*phase: x21 ¼ 2:93, p = 0.087). Although the
majority of children performed significantly above chance
level in the Test phase, young children’s (below 44 months)
performance did not differ from chance in the Transfer phase.
To examine the main effects of age and phase, we fitted
another model without the non-significant interactions. The
reduced model also fitted the data better than the null
model (x24 ¼ 31:21, p < 0.001, electronic supplementary
material, table S3). Older children performed significantly
better than younger ones (Age: x21 ¼ 26:08, p < 0.001; electronic
supplementary material, figure S1). The children’s perform-
ance was not significantly affected by the change in the
order of events (phase: x21 ¼ 1:61, p = 0.205), trial type
(x21 ¼ 2:86, p = 0.091) or trial number (x21 ¼ 2:32, p = 0.128).
There was no significant difference between the performances
of boys and girls (x21 ¼ 0:20, p = 0.653).
We analysed the first trial performance in the Transfer
phase to see how children performed when the order of
events was reversed for the first time. Overall, children per-
formed significantly above chance level (47 out of 68
children chose the correct cup, binomial test: p < 0.01): the
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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majority could adapt to the change in the order of events
from the first trial. Given the significant age effect on per-
formance, we also explored children’s first trial
performance in the Transfer phase across ages. The GLM
analysis with the predictor variable age centred was com-
pared to the null model comprising only the intercept
(electronic supplementary material, table S4). Younger chil-
dren made more errors than older children (x21 ¼ 9:48, p <
0.01). Below 50 months of age children’s performance did
not differ from chance level (electronic supplementary
material, figure S2).
(i) Explanation question
Only 16 children gave the correct explanation to E’s question
‘How did you decide which cup to choose?’ at the end of the
task. Older children gave the correct explanation significantly
more often than younger children (GLM: x21 ¼ 5:15, p < 0.05)
(electronic supplementary material, table S5). None of the chil-
dren below 48 months gave the correct explanation (figure 2).
(d) Discussion
Most children could use the ripped foil spontaneously as a
cue to detect the location of the hidden reward in the Pre-
test phase. Older preschoolers went on to distinguish
between the ripped foil caused by the reward and that
caused by the ‘irrelevant’ cause (i.e. the pen) in the Test
phase. Results from the Transfer phase, overall and in the
first trial, also showed that older preschoolers were not
using an arbitrary rule to solve the task. We suggest that
the older preschoolers inferred the likely cause of the visible
traces and used this information to locate the reward. On the
other hand, children’s verbal explanations about how they
found the sticker lagged behind their performance: the
majority of the children could not provide the correct expla-
nation. Similar differences between children’s performance
and causal explanations were found in a study that explored
5–10-year-old children’s understanding of continuous causal
processes [48].
Possible explanations for the comparatively poor per-
formance of 3-year olds will be discussed in the general
discussion.3. Experiment 2—capuchin monkeys
(a) Methods
(i) Participants
Nineteen capuchin monkeys housed in Living Links Research
Centre Edinburgh Zoo (Nfemales = 6, Mage = 9.11, s.d.age = 3.86)
participated. All monkeys that were available and willing to
participate were tested. Nine participants got food–stick trials
in the Test phase and stick–food in the Transfer phase, and 10
participants got the reverse order (electronic supplementary
material, table S6). The research was conducted in accordance
with the regulations of the University of St Andrews’ Animal
Welfare and Ethics Committee and Edinburgh Zoo.
(b) Materials
The same as in Experiment 1. We used raisins or dates as
rewards. We used a table with wheels to present the materials
levelled with the bottom of the testing cubicle.(i) Procedure
The procedure for the monkeys differed from children in the
following ways: (i) the monkeys received an additional
Warm-up for familiarization. The monkeys had extensive
experience in finding a reward hidden in cups [49]—so this
phase was just to ensure that the novel materials (tall colour-
ful cups) did not cause any neophobia. The monkeys were
able to pass this phase with no difficulty. (ii) Monkeys
received eight trials per session and the criterion to pass a
phase was 14/16 trials correct (binomial test: p = 0.001) in
two consecutive sessions. (iii) We decided (also due to our
limited sample size) that if monkeys did not perform at
above chance levels in the first 16 trials, they would receive
further trials (electronic supplementary material, table S7)
to see if they could learn the task before moving on to the
last phase where we evaluated their ability to flexibly transfer
to a reversed order of events.
Warm-up. E put a raisin in one of the cups in full view and
pushed the table towards the subject to choose. The number
of sessions needed to pass this phase ranged from two to 18
(M = 7.0, s.d. = 5.36).
Pre-test. Same as in Experiment 1. Monkeys could receive
up to 10 sessions in total if they did not reach the criterion
sooner. All the monkeys passed this phase within two to
six sessions (M = 2.94, s.d. = 1.13). For the purposes of com-
parison with the child data (criterion: 4/5 correct), it is
worth noting that eight out of 19 monkeys reached the cri-
terion in the first five trials (electronic supplementary
material, table S7 for a comparison).
Test. The same as in Experiment 1. If the participants did
not reach the criterion sooner, they moved on to the Transfer
phase after 10 sessions.
Transfer. The participants received two sessions (16 trials)
in the reverse order to the Test phase.
(ii) Scoring and analysis
Scoring was the same as Experiment 1.
In the main analyses, we used the last 16 trials of the Test
phase for each monkey (as opposed to all trials) and the 16
trials (two sessions) of the Transfer phase. Since we were inter-
ested in the potential performance change from Test to
Transfer, we wanted to include the monkeys’ best performance
in the Test phase.
The full model comprised phase (Test/Transfer), trial type
(food–stick/stick–food) and their interaction; age, sex and trial
number as fixed effects. Subject ID was included as the
random effect as well as all possible random slope components
except for the correlations between random intercepts and
slopes. Comparisons to the hypothetical chance level were
done in the same way as in Experiment 1. There were no
issues with regards to the model stability or multicollinearity.
(c) Results
The monkeys’ performance in the first eight trials of the Test
phase did not differ from chance (0.16 ± 0.17, z = 0.93, p =
0.35). Only 1/19 monkeys performed above chance level in
the first eight trials of the Test phase according to a two-
tailed binomial test ( p = 0.001). We therefore proceeded to
give the monkeys further trials to explore their ability to
learn to solve this task, and then transfer their knowledge.
The number of sessions needed to pass the Test phase
ranged from a minimum of two (16 trials) to a maximum
1.00
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(a) (b)
Figure 3. Performance of monkeys in the Test (a) and Transfer (b) phases across trials in Experiment 2. Dotted line shows the chance level. Dashed line shows the
model predictions (models were fitted separately for each phase; all conducted trials were included in these models) and the shaded area is the bootstrapped 95%
confidence interval. (Online version in colour.)
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of 10 (80 trials). Most of the monkeys (15 of 19) completed the
maximum number of sessions before they moved on to the
Transfer phase without meeting the criterion (electronic sup-
plementary material, table S7). The binomial tests for each of
the 15 ‘unsuccessful’ individuals showed that when consider-
ing all 80 trials in the Test phase, five of them performed
significantly above chance.
When comparing the last 16 trials of the Test and the 16
trials of the Transfer phases, the monkeys performed signifi-
cantly above chance level in both Test (Est. ± s.e.: 0.78 ± 0.17,
z = 4.63, p < 0.001) and Transfer (0.72 ± 0.13, z = 5.61, p < 0.001)
(figure 3). They also performed significantly above chance in
both trial types (food–stick: 0.97 ± 0.17, z = 5.84, p < 0.001 and
stick–food: 0.53 ± 0.12, z = 4.34, p < 0.001).
The full model comprising of phase, trial type and their
interaction as well as age, sex and trial number fit the data
better than the null model which lacked these fixed effects
(x25 ¼ 13:49, p < 0.05, electronic supplementary material,
table S8). However, the interaction term was not significant
and was removed. The reduced model also fitted the data
better than the null model (x24 ¼ 13:58, p < 0.01, electronic
supplementary material, table S9). Monkeys performed
better in the food–stick trials than stick–food trials
(x21 ¼ 5:22, p < 0.05) and males performed better than females
(x21 ¼ 7:59, p < 0.01). The sample was unbalanced with
regards to sex due to availability sampling; therefore, sex
differences were not analysed further.
There was no effect of phase (x21 ¼ 0:06, p = 0.808), age
(x21 ¼ 1:59, p = 0.207) nor trial number (x21 ¼ 0:02, p = 0.890).
These results indicated that monkeys’ overall performance
was not influenced by the change in the order of events in the
Transfer phase. However, the first trial analysis of the Transfer
phase showed that monkeys performed at chance level (9/19
individuals chose the correct cup, binomial test: p = 0.18).
We further found that the Transfer performance of the mon-
keys that reached the criterion in the Test phase (N = 4) did not
differ from those that did not reach the criterion in the Testphase (N = 15) (x22 ¼ 5:45, p= 0.065, electronic supplementary
material, table S10).(d) Discussion
When we analysed the first eight trials of the Test phase (the
number of children received), monkeys’ performance did not
deviate from chance level. However, over a greater number of
trials, they located the reward in the correct cup at above
chance levels, with some reaching criterion in the Test
phase. Performance over the 16 trials of the Transfer phase
showed that they could adapt to the change in the order of
events. However, the first trial analysis of the Transfer
showed that, like younger children, monkeys did not
spontaneously adjust their choice to the order of events.
We found a significant effect of trial type (better perform-
ance in the food–stick trials than in stick–food trials).
Differing attention and memory demands associated with
these trial types may be a plausible explanation for this find-
ing. In the food–stick trials, once the subject saw one cup was
ripped after the food was picked up, it did not need to pay
attention to the rest of the trial to solve the task, provided it
could remember the location of the first ripped foil. Indeed,
we observed that in food–stick trials, after the first cup was
revealed to be ripped (by the food), the monkeys would
often move to that side of the cubicle and reach through
the hole in the window until the end of the trial without
paying any attention to E’s next actions (i.e. picking up the
stick to rip the other cup). On the other hand, in the stick-
food trials, they had to remember which cup was ripped
initially to locate the reward in the correct cup after the
food hiding event. Paying attention only to the result of the
food hiding event would not lead to success because by
then, both foils are ripped. The monkeys performed above
chance in both trial types, therefore better performance in
one would not explain their overall success. However, it
might point to the role of executive functions (i.e. working
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 4. A visual illustration of (a) Pre-test 2, (b) Test and (c) Transfer phases of Experiment 3. The illustration shows a food–stick trial for the Test phase and a
stick–food trial for the Transfer phase (the order of the conditions was counterbalanced across participants). The star represents the food-reward. The diagonal arrow
shows the temporal progression of the trial. (Online version in colour.)
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memory and attentional flexibility) in problem-solving based
on indirect visual cues.
Overall, the monkeys received a larger number of warm-
up, pre-test and test trials than the children. We carried out
these additional phases and multiple trials to ensure that
the monkeys could use the ripped foil as a cue to locate the
reward and keep track of two events before they moved on
to the critical Transfer phase. However, given this extensive
experience, the monkeys might have learnt a rather complex
arbitrary rule: ‘Focus on the state change after E picks up
the reward’. We address this possibility in Experiment 3.4. Experiment 3—arbitrary follow-up with
capuchin monkeys
Instead of covering the cups with foil as in Experiments 1&2,
in this experiment, E covered them with white paper, and
instead of the state change following the event behind the
barrier being that one of the foil covers was ripped, it was
that one by one these white covers were exchanged for
covers painted with black zigzags. If the monkeys represented
the causal relationship between the state change in foil and the
food’s hiding, we expected weaker performance when the cues
were arbitrarily related to the location of the reward.
(a) Methods
(i) Participants
Fourteen capuchin monkeys of the same sample participated
in this experiment (Nfemales = 5, Mage = 9.07, s.d.age = 3.46)
(electronic supplementary material, table S6).(b) Materials
The same cups were used. Instead of foil, we used two pieces of
plain white paper and two pieces of white paper painted with a
black zigzag to cover the cups (electronic supplementary
material, figure S3).
(i) Procedure
Same as in Experiment 2 except for Pre-test 1.
Pre-test 1. E showed two empty cups to the subject and
behind a barrier put a raisin in one of the cups and covered
it with a black-zigzagged lid. In the end, the subject saw a
cup without a lid and one covered with paper. The aim of
this phase was to familiarize the monkeys with the novel
lid and finding a reward in one of the cups using the zig-
zagged paper as a cue. The number of sessions needed to
pass this phase ranged from two to 11 (M = 4.29, s.d. = 2.55).
Pre-test 2. The two cups were covered with white paper in
the beginning of the trial. In the end, the empty cup remained
covered with white paper, while the cover of the baited cup
was exchanged with a zigzag-patterned paper lid. All partici-
pants passed this phase within two sessions, the minimum
number of sessions required.
Test. The same as in Experiment 2 with the only difference
being that the paper lids changed from white to patterned
following the events behind the barrier instead of foil.
Transfer. The participants received two sessions in the
reverse order to the Test phase (figure 4).
(ii) Scoring and analysis
The same as Experiments 1&2. There were no issues regarding
the model stability or multicollinearity.
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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(c) Results
The number of sessions needed to pass the Test phase ranged
from two to 10 (M = 8.35, s.d. = 3.27). Most of the monkeys (11
of 14) completed 10 sessions without meeting the criterion
before they moved on to the Transfer phase.
Overall, monkeys’ performance did not deviate from
chance in the Test (Est. ± s.e.: 0.48 ± 0.24, z = 1.99, p = 0.139)
or in Transfer phases (0.27 ± 0.16, z = 1.74, p = 0.162) (elec-
tronic supplementary material, figure S4). A GLMM
comprising of phase, trial type and their interaction as well
as age, sex and trial number was a better fit to the data
than the null model (x25 ¼ 11:67, p < 0.05) (electronic sup-
plementary material, table S11). However, the interaction
term was not significant (x21 ¼ 0:88, p = 0.348) so we removed
it. The reduced model was also a better fit than the null
model (x24 ¼ 10:79, p < 0.05, electronic supplementary
material, table S12). Only trial type had a significant effect
on performance (x21 ¼ 5:81, p < 0.05): monkeys performed sig-
nificantly better than chance in food–stick trials (0.79 ± 0.30,
z = 2.68, p < 0.05) but not in stick–food trials (0.04 ± 0.13,
z = 0.27, p = 0.789) (electronic supplementary material,
figure S5). The first trial performance in the Transfer phase
did not differ from chance level (five of 14 individuals
chose the correct cup, binomial test: p = 0.424).
(d) Discussion
The monkeys did not perform significantly above chance
levels when the cues were arbitrarily related to the location
of the reward, in contrast with their performance in the
causal task. These findings are consistent with the notion
that the monkeys benefited from a representation of the phys-
ical object–object interactions involved in the foil task. On the
other hand, in both Experiments 2 and 3, monkeys benefitted
from trials that had lower demands on working memory
(i.e. food–stick trials).5. General discussion
Our results suggest that by 4 years of age children could
make causal inferences based on visible traces, in the absence
of a verbal prompt to identify the cause of an outcome. By
contrast, younger preschoolers and capuchin monkeys did
not show robust evidence for this ability, as they performed
at chance in the first trial of transfer task. However, given
additional experience capuchin monkeys were able to trans-
fer their knowledge to the reversed order of events only
when the visual traces were causally related to the food’s
location (Experiment 2) as opposed to when they were arbi-
trarily related (Experiment 3). This suggests that causal
representations may play a role in their problem-solving.
Similar age differences were found in previous studies
[18,22], in which 3-year olds reverted to biased responses
when they were required to reason from effects to causes. This
developmental difference was also found in studies where
young children had to reason about hidden properties of objects
such internal properties or weight [50–52], or about objects
whose efficacy they never observed before [53]. Taken together,
these findings suggest that the ability to reason fromevidence to
causes undergoes developmental change between 3 and 4 years
of age. As causal reasoning is not a unitary ability but rather an
emergent capacity resulting from the interplay of distinctabilities (e.g. statistical learning, domain-general processing
capacity, domain-specific knowledge of causal relations, cultural
input) that develop significantly during preschool years, several
possibilities could explain this difference.
One possible explanation is that 3-year olds lacked the
required background knowledge about the specific events
and materials involved. However, we do not think this is a
likely explanation. Children, as well as capuchin monkeys
would all have some first-hand experience with ripping
paper, cardboard boxes and leaves/grass that would provide
them with the necessary prior experience to formulate this
object knowledge, if they were capable of doing so. However,
if young children lacked this knowledge, it would have been
challenging to pass the task within the eight trials they were
given. To explore this further, 3-year olds could be provided
with additional experience (e.g. poking tissues or paper
with sticks) to see if they generalized this knowledge to the
experimental context.
Alternatively, the performance of younger children (and
capuchin monkeys) on this task could be influenced by the
limitations in their processing capacity. Executive functions
develop significantly between 3 and 4 years [54,55]. It has
been found that children’s working memory capacity was a
better predictor than their chronological age for their per-
formance on reasoning tasks [56]. In this study, we did not
assess children’s ability to keep track of two events in the
absence of inference-making requirement (but for evidence
that they can do so, see [57]). Measuring causal reasoning
abilities alongside executive functions would be informative
to explore this further. These abilities might constrain
causal reasoning, or they might mask its expression if task
demands overwhelm executive functions.
Another possibility is the emergence of a more abstract
notion of a causal mechanism. Children between the ages 3
and 4 years are known to have a developing knowledge
about how events are related to their outcomes [13,15,16]. It
is likely that their understanding is limited to certain mechan-
isms they have direct experience with (such as toys working
with batteries) and over time they begin to generalize this
knowledge and develop an explicit understanding that all
causes lead to their effects through a mechanism. One route
to doing this might be through the use of language. Especially
in cases where children do not have access to the causal infor-
mation visually, verbal input from others (e.g. instructions,
explicit teaching, alerting to the presence of a mechanism,
requests for explanations) becomes a valuable source of infor-
mation [9]. Once children learn that the causes of certain
events may not be directly observable, they may form a new
concept, ‘hidden causes’, which may act as a placeholder for
further learning [10]. This would not necessarily specify the
cause of a particular event, but it could motivate children to
look for causes when faced with indirect evidence.
This explanation is consistent with a previous study in
which 4-year olds (but not 3-year olds) used indirect auditory
cues to locate a fallen object [25]. In that study, we ran a set of
follow-up experiments to explore the reasons for 3-year-olds’
failure and found that adding causal framing to the test ques-
tion improved 3-year-olds’ performance. Further research
could examine if in this task, changing the question from
‘where is the sticker?’ to ‘which cover did I rip with the
sticker?’ would boost performance in this age group. This
kind of causal framing might provide an important scaffold
for children’s emerging ability to identify and diagnose
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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causes from indirect information, both in an experimental
context and in the real world.
While the performance of the monkeys on the initial trials of
this task were similar to the younger preschoolers, with
additional trials capuchins learnt to locate the reward in the cor-
rect cup, and theywere able to flexibly transfer this knowledge to
avariant of the taskwhere the order of events reversed. This suc-
cessful performance when there were real physical causal
relations as opposed to their chance-level performance in the
arbitrary follow-up suggests that representation of causal
object–object interactions played a role in their ability to learn
to use physical traces to locate rewards. This is in line with a
previous study where monkeys successfully used causal (e.g.
shaken baited cup) but not arbitrary auditory cues (e.g. recorded
sound of a shaken cup) to locate a reward [36,58]. The additional
exposure might have facilitated performance by making them
more familiar with the causal relations involved. Research
using different paradigms has shown that the performance of
both capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees in novel tasks
improved after repeated practice [59–61], especially if they
received the task in progressively increasing levels of difficulty
[59]. It might be that, in the absence of direct visual experience
of causal mechanisms, non-human primates need more
experience to ‘fill in the gap’. Futurework could explorewhether
3-year olds would show a similar competence.
To conclude, we introduced a novel paradigm that made
it possible to explore inference making without verbal
prompts to look for and identify causes in children and
non-human primates. Our results suggest that by 4 years of
age, preschool children can detect unseen causes based on
evidence alone. With more experience, capuchin monkeys
were able to use information about physical object–objectinteractions to solve problems, even though these were not
directly observed.
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